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Abstract 
This research project sets out to evaluate China’s involvement within South Sudan            
between 2005 and 2014. The areas of focus will be China’s economic interests of resource               
extraction, specifically oil and arms trade. China’s increased political and military involvement            
in South Sudan will be explained by applying the model of Flexigemony. Utilizing the concept               
of non-interference, one of the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy, the scope conditions              
under which China decided to increase its political and military influence in South Sudan will be                
studied. By studying China’s engagement to South Sudan this research project will attempt to              
capture China’s changing engagement towards the African continent and its partner states. In             
addition, the argument will be made that China’s increased military and political involvement in              
South Sudan stemmed from the primacy of economic interest and China’s attempt to adjust its               
foreign policy in regard to the domestic situation in South Sudan. In effect, this resulted in the                 
deterioration of the non-interference policy.  
Keywords: Flexigemony, non-interference, resource extraction, China, South Sudan,        
arms trade. 
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2 
Introduction 
 
Sudan has long been plagued with armed conflict, poverty, genocide and instability. In             
2011, due to continued ethnic and religious violence, the country was split into two. The divide                
saw the creation of South Sudan, currently the youngest country in the world. However, despite               
its secession from Sudan, unrest and instability have continued to be major inhibitors of South               
Sudan’s development. Currently, ”South Sudan […] faces grave political, economic and           
developmental challenges, with some of the worst global social indicators, a fragmented            
government, militarized society, limited governance capacity, huge numbers of refugees, and           
widespread corruption.” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 394) Some scholars have pointed to the presence of              
oil in the country as one of the main factors negatively influencing the political, social and                
institutional stability of the country (Patey, 2010, p. 617) 
China, due to its ever-expanding need for resources to sustain economic growth (Patey,             
2007, p. 1010), has become a prominent influence on domestic affairs within Sudan and South               
Sudan. Oil has been the central building block for Sino-(South) Sudanese relations, through             
which bilateral investments and diplomatic ties have developed. This has resulted in China             
quickly becoming the largest trade partner (Patey, 2007, p. 1010). Between 2004 and 2008 “[o]il               
has represented […] roughly 90 percent of Sudan’s total exports” (Patey, 2010, p. 620).              
Incidentally, this makes Sudan’s government more reliant on the revenues from this sector than              
any other country in the world (Shankleman, 2011, p. 11). In addition, China’s sale of arms to                 
Sudan is another significant component of the economic cooperation between the two countries.             
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Despite internationally established embargoes, designed to stop weapons entering Sudan, China           
has continued the sale of arms in its pursuit of economic interest abroad (Taylor, 2007b, p. 19). 
South Sudan becoming an autonomous region within Sudan (after the signing of the             
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005) and South Sudan’s secession from Sudan have            
presented China with major challenges. “The geographic situation of oil in the South, oil              
infrastructure in the North, and China’s presence, create a triangulation of mandatory, if uneasy,              
relations between the three counties” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 394). China, in an attempt to safeguard               
its economic interest in the region, had to develop and sustain bilateral ties with both Sudan and                 
South Sudan. This balancing act became crucial in order to facilitate continued oil imports from               
the region (Large, 2007). However, it also meant that China was forced to increase its political                
and military commitments to the region (Large, 2009, p. 619). This was problematic for China               
due to the fact that it had long proclaimed that the principles of non-interference and sovereignty                
should form the foundations of international relations (Carmody, 2010, p. 504). Effectively,            
China’s increased involvement in the political affairs of South Sudan and Sudan has resulted in a                
weakening of China’s non-interference policy. In turn, this has resulted in scholars posing the              
question whether or not it is tenable for China to secure its economic interests based on an                 
ideology of non-interference ​(Power, 2012). The case of Sino-South Sudanese relations is seen             
as pivotal in understanding the changing nature of China’s involvement in Africa, showing that              
“strategic expediency trumps principle and rhetoric” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 398). China’s foreign            
policy and its guiding principle of non-interference will further be elaborated upon in the              
theoretical framework of this thesis.  
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Research Question and Objectives 
 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the bilateral ties between China and South Sudan.                
The model of Flexigemony, as developed by Carmody and Taylor (2011), is used to explore the                
changes in China’s engagement to South Sudan. This model, which will be discussed and              
evaluated in detail in the theoretical framework of this thesis, “is first and foremost about               
economics and the politics required to support China’s continued economic ascent.” (Carmody,            
2010, p. 512) It theorizes the primacy of economic interest in China’s foreign policy over               
political and security concerns. Moreover, it allows for the possibility of China diverting from its               
long-standing policy of non-interference in order to safeguard economic interests. Flexigemony           
states that China “uses a combination of economic, political and military levers in flexible              
strategic combinations to ensure continued raw material supplies” (Carmody, 2011, p. 79).            
However, the model fails to specify under which conditions China is willing to divert from its                
traditional approach of non-interference. This thesis will attempt to identify the scope conditions             
present within the case study of Sino-South Sudanese relations that resulted in increased political              
and military involvement of China in South Sudan.  
This research project will set out to achieve several goals. The first objective is to               
elaborate upon the model of flexigemony by applying it to a case it has not been applied to                  
before. ​Due to the contemporary nature of the case at hand, a lack of empirical studies exists.                 
The importance of the case at hand is iterated (Alden, 2010, p. 6) and theorized by scholars yet                  
little scholarly work on China’s involvement in South Sudan is generated thus far. One of the                
aims of this proposed research is to be added to the body of research pertaining Chinese relations                 
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to South Sudan in order to fill this gap. Furthermore, the case will be used to specify the scope                    
conditions under which China has increased its political and military involvement in South             
Sudan. Secondly, this research aims to analyze the Sino-South Sudanese bilateral ties to uncover              
the changing nature of China’s engagement to African states. Thirdly, by utilizing the case of               
Sino-South Sudanese relations this thesis aims to illustrate discrepancies between China’s           
rhetoric of non-interference, sovereignty and ‘South-South cooperation’ as opposed to its           
practices of oil diplomacy, arms trade and increased military and political involvement. 
In line with the aforementioned goals, the following research question is proposed: ‘​To             
what extent does the flexigemony model explain the political and military intervention of China              
in South Sudan between 2005 and 2014?’ 
To answer this question, chapter one will provide historical background of the            
Sino-South Sudanese relationship. Chapter two will, through applying the model of flexigemony,            
analyze China’s engagement to South Sudan. Chapter three will focus on the weakening of              
China’s non-interference policy and the sale of arms within the context of bilateral ties between               
China and South Sudan. Together, these chapters aim at uncovering China’s changing approach             
to South Sudan in its continued pursuit of economic interest. Lastly, in the conclusion the               
research question will be answered. 
To limit the scope of this research project, the case of South Sudan will be analyzed                
between 2005 and 2014. The CPA between Sudan and South Sudan was signed in 2005, making                
South Sudan an autonomous region within Sudan. From this year on China started developing              
diplomatic and economic ties with the region (James, 2015, p.13). In line with the research               
question, this project will evaluate the dynamics of the bilateral ties between the China and South                
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Sudan until the United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2014, where China sent 700 troops              
(Bariyo, 2014). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section the theoretical considerations, concepts and approach will be discussed.            
First, China’s approach to Africa will be discussed. This is done by laying out China’s foreign                
policy, comparing it to the Western model and elaborating upon its appeal for recipient African               
states. Second, the model of flexigemony will be discussed and operationalized by evaluating             
relevant components of the theory. Specifically, China’s pursuit of economic interest regarding            
oil and arms trade will be considered.  
First of all, China’s foreign policy and its engagement to Africa will be discussed.              
China’s foreign policy, formulated in 1954, has been based on “[t]he ‘five principles of              
pancheela ​[…] These were as follows: ‘respect for territorial integrity; nonaggression; non-            
interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit in relations; and peaceful              
coexistence” ​(Power, 2012, p. 41). China’s economic growth could not be sustained with natural              
resources that were present domestically (Manyok, 2016, p. 1). ​Therefore, in order to ensure              
continued economic growth it became a necessity for China to import natural resources from              
abroad (Meyersson, 2008, p. 2). ​The African continent, holding massive quantities of untapped             
resources such as oil and timber, provided a unique opportunity for China to build bilateral trade                
relations with many African states in order to provide the necessary resources for continued              
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economic development. ​As of 2005, there are more than 800 Chinese companies in 49 African               
countries (Alden, 2010 p. 14). 
China has carefully framed its engagement to African states as mutually beneficial            
economic cooperation, in which “sincerity, equality and mutual benefit; solidarity and common            
development” form the foundation on which bilateral ties are built (Alden, 2010 p. 15). In part,                
China’s quick ascent into African markets was made possible due to its “deliberate promotion of               
a foreign policy of ‘no political strings’ which, when coupled with Beijing’s willingness to              
provide aid and concessionary loans, has proved to be tremendously appealing to African             
leaders.” (Alden, 2010 p. 8) Furthermore, China proclaims to utilize a model of development that               
is distinct from the approach taken by the West (Nassanga, 2014). Branding Western             
development efforts as normative and intrusive, China aims to provide aid without interference             
in domestic affairs of countries. “[T]he Chinese have been much more focused on growth and               
productive investment as opposed to the ‘software’ of governance that might underpin economic             
development. This is much more about mutual benefit than a discourse of charity or of ‘catching                
up’.” (Power, 2012, p. 135) Many African states found China’s approach to be an appealing               
alternative as opposed to Western conditional aid (Taylor, 2004, p. 85). This is especially true for                
African states that have been unwilling to adhere to Western regulations regarding the             
improvement of human rights and democracy (Nassanga, 2014). “[B]oth China and Africa            
believed themselves to have experienced and to continue to face common enemies, namely             
imperialism and neo-imperialism from the developed world.” (Taylor, 2004, 41 p. 86) Since             
many African leaders view the Western model of engagement as intrusive and normative, it is               
8 
no wonder that China’s proclaimed focus on building mutually beneficial economic partnerships            
was welcomed (Taylor, 2004, p. 86). 
However, continued adherence to non-interference together with increasing involvement         
in Africa (especially in both Sudans) has proven to be a challenge for Chinese policy makers                
(Bradbury, 2012, p. 375). In order to uncover the conditions under which China is willing to                
abandon its non-interference policy the model of flexigemony is used. The flexigemonic model             
allows for China diverting from the non-interference policy. However, the scope conditions            
leading to this diversion are not specified. This research aims to assess the case of Sino-South                
Sudanese relations in order to establish the conditions under which China moved away from its               
policy of non-interference. The economic interests of oil extraction, arms trade and diverting             
from the non-interference policy together form an intricate image of Sino-South Sudanese            
relations. The model of flexigemony is selected in order to incorporate these intertwined factors              
in the larger context of this model. 
Power (2012, p. 245) argues that: “non-interference has always been a flexible practice,             
depending on the circumstances, and also that such a principle necessarily cannot be permanent.”              
China, in its search for oil on the African continent, has signed multiple agreements with various                
authoritarian regimes. In turn, to ensure continued resource extraction, it became of vital             
importance for China to protect these regimes. This strategy of protecting continued oil             
extraction from African states, first observed and incorporated within the flexigemony model by             
Carmody and Taylor (2011), is executed through “different strands of engagement and modes of              
governance: clientelism, proxy force and hegemony.” (Power, 2012, p. 245) Flexigemony, or            
‘ruling at a distance’, attempts to capture this Chinese strategy to African states. It distinguishes               
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itself as a model from other research that has explained China’s pursuit for oil abroad as a form                  
of ‘soft power’. Flexigemony refutes this idea, arguing that China supplying military training,             
support and equipment to many of its partner states illustrates China’s willingness to use hard               
power to secure its economic investments (Carmody, 2010, 499). China’s support for            
Khartoum’s government and its investments in Sudan’s military can be seen as an example of               
China’s use of hard power and proxy force to ensure its investments in Sudan’s oil industry                
(Bradbury, 2012). In addition, Manyok concluded that “as Sudan’s oil exports to China increase;              
Sudan’s arms imports from China increase as well.” (Manyok, 2016, p. 3) ​On the one hand                
flexigemony explains China’s sale of arms as a pursuit of enlarging its export market while on                
the other, as a tool to ensure continued resource extraction. Chapter three will address the               
contradictory issue of purely economical arms sales within the context of flexigemony and             
elaborate upon its  interfering consequences.  
The following components are inherent to the model of flexigemony: first of all,             
flexigemony refrains from “seeking a societal transformation” rather it focuses on “natural            
resources and the cultivation of support constituencies” (Carmody, 2011, p. 79). This component             
will be discussed in ​chapter one​, where the historical background of the development of bilateral               
ties between China and South Sudan is examined. Secondly, flexigemony states that economic             
interests take primacy over political and security considerations. In ​chapter one and two of this               
thesis case-specific information on Sino-South Sudanese relations will show how economic           
interest takes primacy over political and security concerns. Thirdly, “a combination of economic,             
political and military levers” must ensure sustained resource extraction (Carmody, 2011, p. 79).             
A discussion of this component can be found in ​chapter three​, where, by assessing              
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non-interference and arms trade, China’s pursuit of resource extraction is analyzed. Fourthly,            
economic power and proxy sub-contracting, rather than direct military force, are used to secure              
interests. Fifthly, China’s flexigemonic approach strengthens the sovereignty of its partner states,            
both internationally and domestically (Carmody, 2011, p. 79). This component of the            
flexigemony model can be considered a contentious point within the specific context of China’s              
engagement of Sudan and South Sudan. A discussion on this component can be found in chapter                
two​. There it is argued that China’s engagement towards South Sudan strengthened South             
Sudanese sovereignty whilst it weakened Sudan’s sovereignty both domestically and          
internationally. Lastly, flexigemony is “reinforced by frequent high-level state visits as a form of              
public diplomacy and to build inter-state trust” (Carmody, 2011, p. 80). 
Flexigemony is a flexible approach, where China adjusts its strategy to each African state              
individually, taking into account historical and geographical factors (Carmody, 2016, p. 4). The             
fact that China is considered to divert from its strict adherence to sovereignty and              
non-interference in the context of South Sudan is a testimony to the adaptive nature of the                
flexigemonic approach. Incidentally, diverting from these long-standing principles of foreign          
policy in South Sudan has allowed continued and intensified territorial and political instability             
(Bradbury, 2012, p. 398). 
Having considered the relevant theoretical concepts and having provided a context within            
China’s engagement to Africa can be analyzed, the historical background of Sino-South            
Sudanese bilateral ties will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 
11 
Research Design 
 
In order to structure the proposed research project a qualitative research method will be              
used. The research of this single case study will focus on China’s pursuit of economic interest in                 
the context of bilateral ties with South Sudan. This is done in order elaborate upon the model of                  
Flexigemony ​and to explore the case of Sino-South Sudanese relations to gain new insight in the                
case at hand. Agreeing with George and Bennett, the goal of this case study is “the detailed                 
examination of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be              
generalizable to other events” (George, 2005, p.5). With the case study this thesis aims to capture                
the changes in China’s engagement not just to South Sudan but to the African continent. This is                 
done by exploring the fundamental (economic) interests of China in regard to its engagement to               
African states while also exploring China’s changing approach in its attempt to satisfy these              
interests. These goals of the research project align with the heuristic case study, where a               
particular case is selected in order to derive more general propositions (Levy, 2002). ​In the               
context of this research project this means that the Sino-South Sudanese relation is analyzed to               
explore the changes of China’s engagement to African states. 
To answer the proposed research question a method of establishing the causal narratives             
is applied. The dependent variable is China’s decision to send 700 peacekeeping forces in 2014,               
effectively increasing its military involvement in South Sudan. The independent variables, as            
previously elaborated upon in the theoretical framework, will be the economic interest of ‘Arms              
Trade’ and ’Oil Extraction’. In addition, the principle of ‘Non-interference’ will be used as a               
variable to further paint the picture of why China decided to increase its political and military                
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involvement within South Sudan. The objective of this research is to analyze the foundations on               
which China built its bilateral ties with South Sudan by using the model of flexigemony.               
Furthermore, since the case study spans from 2005 to 2014, this research will analyze the               
changes in China’s ties with South Sudan by offering case-specific explanations as to why these               
changes took place. 
 
Data Collection 
 
In order to answer my research question the following data is collected. First of all, a                
large body of academic research exists on the topic of Chinese relations with African states.               
These sources, including numerous books, publications and academic articles, will be used to             
evaluate: China’s non-interference policy, China’s role within the international community, the           
effects of arms trade for Sudan and South Sudan, and China’s oil diplomacy and engagement to                
Sudan and South Sudan. Together, these secondary sources will also be used to answer the               
research question and to put the Sino-South Sudanese relationship in the greater context of              
Chinese relations with Africa. The collected data will be used to explore the theoretical              
considerations of the flexigemony model through its application to the Sino-South Sudanese            
relationship. The data collected will serve to provide an answer regarding the question of why               
China has become involved both politically and militarily. However, an analysis regarding how             
this involvement is conducted is largely omitted as it is beyond the scope of the research                
question. While the case of South Sudan has not been analyzed by other scholars through the                
model of flexigemony, data regarding specific indicators of the model is present both within the               
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primary and secondary data. Primary data will be drawn from reports on arms sales (Leff, 2014),                
the CIA World Factbook, reports on South Sudan’s oil industry (Shankleman, 2011), and a              
special report from the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2006) regarding arms in Sudan              
and South Sudan. While the reports on arms sales indicate the involvement of China, they remain                
opaque regarding the precise numbers and figures due to the fact that this data could not be                 
collected. This does not present a direct problem for the argumentation of this thesis since the                
reports, in combination with secondary literature, manage to convey the considerable           
implications for Sudan and South Sudan regardless. Newspaper articles will be used to refer to               
certain crucial events between 2005 and 2014, such as the independence of South Sudan in 2011                
and the military intervention of 2014. Furthermore, Chinese officials (introduced in the thesis)             
will be quoted on occasion to illustrate the chinese position. 
 
Chapter 1  
The development of bilateral ties between China and South Sudan 
 
In this chapter the development of bilateral ties between China and South Sudan will be               
discussed to provide the context within which China’s involvement can be analyzed in the              
following chapters. Furthermore, the Sino-South Sudanese ties discussed in this chapter will be             
evaluated in the context of the flexigemony model. 
Many scholars agree that China’s relation with Sudan and South Sudan can be seen as a                
testing ground for China’s future endeavors in Africa (Alden, 2010, p. 7) (Patey, 2007, p. 1008).                
“Sudan is […] a defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa, and a key illustration of                 
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transition and convergence in China’s international politics” (Large, 2008, p. 105). Furthermore,            
“Sudan is seen as the geopolitical territory where Beijing faces the challenge of accommodating              
its established and ideological policy with the complexity of African politics” (Bradbury, 2012,             
p. 363). The relevance of this research thus partially stems from its goal to analyze the changing                 
nature of China’s engagement to South Sudan. In turn, the findings of this thesis can contribute                
to the body of work pertaining to the changing relations of China to the African continent as a                  
whole. 
In order to analyze the case of Sino-South Sudanese relations within the proposed time              
frame of 2005 to 2014, this paper will also address the bilateral ties between China and Sudan.                 
Since the founding of South Sudan is deeply tied to the conflict it arose from and Chinese                 
activities on either side should always be seen in this context, it is important to consider Sudan’s                 
role within the case study. Furthermore, before South Sudan’s independence in 2011, it was an               
autonomous region within Sudan after the signing of the CPA in 2005. Because of this,               
Sino-South Sudanese relations are inextricably tied to Sudan. Therefore, when necessary,           
Sudan’s role and its ties to China will thus be dealt with as well. The author deems this a                   
necessity to provide an answer to the proposed research question.  
 
China’s oil industry in Sudan 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) initiated operations with Sudan          
during the 1990s, while South Sudan and Sudan were still unified. Sudan’s support for Saddam               
Hussein during the first Gulf War in 1991 (Large, 2008, p. 96) resulted in the US placing Sudan                  
on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism” (Patey, 2014, p. 269) in 1993. In addition, the US                  
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imposed economic sanctions on Sudan in 1997, effectively ending the possibility for US             
companies to invest in Sudan (Patey, 2014, p. 269). These actions by the US government               
presented an opportunity for the CNPC to move into Sudan, in an attempt to build an oil industry                  
(Large, 2008, p. 96). Sudan’s government, now isolated from the US and European countries,              
saw China’s unconditional willingness to invest as a welcome alternative to conditional Western             
investment. Therefore, while Western companies were moving out of Sudan due to conflict and              
human rights violations, China replaced them (Taylor, 2006, p. 950). “If any foreign government              
had an influence on Chinese [...] national oil companies investing in Sudan, it was not Beijing                
[...], it was Washington.” (Patey, 2014, p. 269) 
China’s engagement to Sudan had been minimal prior to China’s investments in Sudan’s             
oil industry. The start of bilateral ties and Chinese investments clearly originated from China’s              
need for oil (Large, 2009, p. 613), which aims to serve China’s annual growth rate of 8% (Looy,                  
2006, p. 14). China’s investment in Sudan resulted in Sudan’s ability to build an oil industry that                 
was able to start exporting oil in August 1999 (Large, 2008, p. 97). As mentioned before,                
Sudan’s political elite welcomed China’s engagement and investments due to the fact that it              
entailed the developing of bilateral ties based on economic interests. Sudan’s human rights             
abuses and civil war resulted in its alienation within the international community. With sanctions              
ensuring that many Western states could no longer invest, it is no wonder that China’s eagerness                
to invest was met with enthusiasm in Khartoum. It is important to note that Sudan, due to its                  
domestic situation, was unable to diversify its foreign relations. In turn, this contributed to              
Sudan’s dependency on China (Reeves, 2018, p. 978) Furthermore, China’s approach to African             
states, and specifically Sudan, is especially appealing for the political elites of these countries.              
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Due to the fact that the engagement “supports prevailing distributions of power and patterns of               
neopatrimonial governance [...]. Thus, paradoxically while seeking to replace Western          
“hegemonism” China is, in part, a status quo power in terms of domestic governance patterns               
and modalities in Africa” (Carmody, 2010, p. 500) This is a key component of flexigemony,               
where China aims to develop bilateral ties with specific constituencies within African states in              
order to gain access to natural resources. The impact of these bilateral ties can be summarized as:                 
a way “to intensify a resource extraction political economy while further concentrating wealth in              
the hands of the elite at the expense of the periphery” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 373). The analysis of                  
the effects of China’s support for Khartoum’s government can be found in chapter three, where               
the argument will be made that China’s engagement constituted a form of interference within              
Sudan and South Sudan.  
In 1989, General Omar Al Bashir overthrew the civilian government and became            
president of Sudan. During this time Sudan was in the midst of fighting a long civil war between                  
northern and southern Sudan. China’s engagement with Bashir resulted in “a toxic oil-for-arms             
relationship” (Wenar, 2015, p. 128). The revenues gained from Sudan’s oil industry were used              
by Khartoum to buy Chinese arms, which were used in Bashir’s violent campaigns into the               
oil-rich region that is now known as South Sudan (Manyok, 2016, p. 1). Violence between north                
and south (temporarily) ended with the signing of the CPA in 2005. The CPA saw the creation of                  
southern Sudan as an autonomous region that would hold a referendum six years later to vote on                 
South Sudan’s independence (Shankleman, 2011, p. 6). 
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China’s shifting focus to South Sudan 
China’s focus on economic interests over previously established political ties became           
apparent when South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011. Diplomatic engagement between            
South Sudan and China started after the CPA was signed. From that moment on, Chinese               
officials made visits to Juba and South Sudanese officials came to Beijing to build bilateral ties.                
A shift in focus of diplomatic engagement from Sudan to South Sudan can be seen during the                 
period post-CPA. South Sudanese territory holds most of the Sudanese oil fields, so when it               
became an autonomous region China understood it needed to build diplomatic ties in order to               
ensure continued resource extraction (Patey, 2014) ​Furthermore, China’s decision to become           
increasingly involved in South Sudan stems from the fact that the state owned ‘National              
Petroleum Corp.’ “holds a 40% stake in a joint venture that operates in South Sudan’s vast oil                 
fields” (Bariyo, 2014) (Alden, 2010, p. 12). ​From their onset, bilateral investments and increased              
diplomatic ties between Chinese leaders and the South Sudanese political elite have revolved             
around oil, which plays a central role in relations between the states (Dent, 2010, p. 94). 
 
China caught in the middle 
Initially, Chinese engagement was viewed with skepticism within South Sudan. This was            
due to the fact that over the years China had supported Sudan’s regime both domestically, by                
supplying it with arms, and internationally, by using its position within the United Nations              
Security Council (UNSC) to prevent intervention (Large, 2011) During the years leading up to              
South Sudan’s independence, China insisted on adhering to Sudan’s sovereignty and used its             
position to argue against further sanctions targeting Khartoum (Bradbury, 2012). In chapter three             
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the changing nature of China’s role within the international community will be evaluated further              
in relation to China’s policy of non-interference. ​Multiple groups within South Sudan, heavily             
affected by China’s arms sale practices and unwavering support for Sudan, had identified China              
as their enemy (Bradbury, 2012, p. 384)​. ​However, the South Sudanese government decided for              
a pragmatic approach towards China. It realized that forcing China out of its territory would               
create uncertainty in regard to its oil exporting capabilities. South Sudan realized its volatile              
security climate did not make for an appealing investment opportunity and was afraid that no one                
would step in to replace China. Instead, South Sudanese officials threatened to nullify existing              
oil contracts with China and the CNPC in order to gain a strong bargaining position that would                 
allow them to make changes to the contracts (Patey, 2014). 
China was trapped in an uneasy triangular relationship where South Sudan held the             
majority of oil reserves and Sudan had the infrastructure to transport the natural resource. In               
order to ensure continued oil extraction China had to enter uncharted territory that required              
increased political involvement. During this period China arranged a number of official state             
visits to both Juba and Khartoum in the hope of brokering a deal that would allow for the                  
continuation of oil exports from the region. However, South Sudan and Sudan were locked in               
disagreement over transit fees that South Sudan was supposed to pay for using Sudan’s pipelines               
used to transport oil. South Sudan threatened to shut down its oil production completely in               
response to the disagreement and eventually did so from January 2012 until August 2012. The               
decision to shut down the production of oil completely was remarkable considering South Sudan              
government generated 98% of its budget from oil revenues. In the following years, China’s              
unofficial role as a mediator between Juba and Khartoum continued (Patey, 2014). We can see               
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here that China started to carefully use its political position and power (a flexigemonic trait) in                
order to continue an uneasy balancing act between the two parties. This remains necessary to               
satisfy China’s economic interest of continued oil extraction from the region. 
Initially, after South Sudan’s independence, it produced nearly 75% of Sudan’s total oil             
output. This amounted to about 500.000 barrels per day (Cia.gov, 2018). Sino-South Sudanese             
trade now entails 12 billion dollars annually, of which 92% is exported by South Sudan.               
Furthermore, China is South Sudan’s largest source of investment, amounting to 5 billion dollars              
total (Richard, 2017). South Sudan’s dependency on oil revenues becomes apparent when            
considering the fact that oil revenues account for 98% of government revenues. Moreover, it              
makes up for 80% of its gross domestic product. Currently, oil production of South Sudan               
averages about 130.000 barrels per day (Cia.gov, 2018). 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The model of Flexigemony and China’s involvement in South Sudan 
 
In this chapter China’s approach and involvement in South Sudan will be assessed and              
explained through the model of Flexigemony. Firstly, an integral part of the model of              
flexigemony is the importance given to economic interests, trumping both political and security             
concerns. In this chapter a discussion will be held whether China’s conduct in Sudan and South                
Sudan aligns with this hierarchical structure of interests. Pursuit of economic interest, as is              
argued in this chapter and the previous one, constitutes the foundation of China’s conduct in               
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South Sudan. Secondly, flexigemony states that, through the development of bilateral ties,            
sovereignty (both domestically and internationally) will be strengthened. Moreover, a discussion           
on the strengthening of South Sudan’s sovereignty fits within the flexigemonic context due to the               
fact that economic considerations formed the foundation for China’s enhancement South Sudan’s            
sovereignty. In turn, as will be explained in this chapter, South Sudan’s increased sovereignty,              
due to China’s support, tarnished Sudan’s sovereignty.  
 
China’s need for oil 
China’s foreign policy has changed over time. The founding 5 guiding principles            
established in the 50’s have long dictated China’s official approach to its trading partners.              
However, with an increased commitment to growth of GDP and the ever-increasing need for              
natural resources to sustain this growth China has adjusted its foreign policy in order to align                
with its economic development (Reeves, 2018). The importance of resources is exemplified by             
China’s shift from being Asia’s leading exporter of oil to becoming the “second largest world               
consumer and the third largest global importer” (Alden, 2009, p. 4) in little over a decade’s time.                 
China has doubled its consumption of oil from 1999 to 2009 and is projected to double its                 
consumption again by 2030. Estimates of China’s oil consumption by 2030 are around 15              
million barrels per day (Alden, 2009, p. 5). 
 
Security considerations 
In 2007, the ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce of China, together with the              
National Development and Reform Commission, published a document called ‘The 2007           
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Guidelines for Investment in Overseas Countries’ Industries’. In it, Sudan was removed from the              
list of countries in which Chinese companies would receive government support. This was due to               
the increased frequency of security incidents involving Chinese companies abroad. Interestingly           
enough, despite Sudan’s removal form this list, the CNPC decided to continue efforts of resource               
extraction in the region. This points to a divergence of policy approach between China’s              
government and the CNPC, a state-owned (but not state-controlled) company (Patey, 2014). The             
CNPC continued its efforts of establishing the infrastructure it required to boost oil extraction              
from Sudan in the midst of a civil war. The CNPC “demonstrated a willingness to side with                 
Khartoum entailing complicity in state-sponsored violence: while the Nuer nationality was being            
depopulated and its villages razed to the ground in Unity State in the relentless search and                
exploitation of oil, the Chinese continued their work as if nothing was happening” (Large, 2008,               
p. 97).  
The fact that China has continued the effort of establishing an oil industry within Sudan               
and South Sudan amidst an ongoing civil war is a testimony to the primacy of economic interest.                 
Chinese workers in South Sudan have been subjected to attacks from rebel groups that aligned               
China’s involvement in the oil sector with Khartoum’s use of violence towards its own              
population. The link between China’s business operations and Sudan’s use of violence is made              
evident by the fact that Sudan has used the revenues from its oil exports to purchase Chinese                 
arms. In turn, South Sudanese armed groups have identified China’s complicitness in the             
continued instability of South Sudan’s security climate (Wenar, 2015, p. 128). 
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Political considerations 
In China’s search for natural resources within the African continent it has engaged with              
many authoritarian regimes. In fact, China’s partner states “almost ubiquitously score within the             
bottom percentile of the World Bank’s 2015 worldwide governance indicators” (Reeves, 2018, p.             
978). ​Western countries have increasingly used their voice to classify certain regimes as ‘rogue              
states’. This has lead to international scrutiny towards numerous regimes that have been accused              
of crimes against humanity and other abuses. China, however, has decided on a distinctly              
different approach, where it refuses to label countries as ‘rogue’. This has allowed China to               
indiscriminately pursue its economic interest, dubbed as China’s “blind support for rogue states”             
(Woods, 2008, p. 1207). ​In the case of Sudan and South Sudan, China’s engagement with the                
political elites has been to the detriment of the populace. China’s non-interference policy             
combined with its investments in Sudan’s oil industry have allowed Sudan’s government to use              
these funds unconditionally and without restrictions ​(Bradbury, 2012, p. 387). In fact, China has              
demonstrated “its willingness to look the other way when sovereign states commit genocide and              
persecution of its citizenry, if it serves China’s national interest [...] - access to oil.” (Power,                
2012, p. 245) 
China’s engagement to authoritarian regimes has always been frame by China as            
mutually beneficial partnerships in pursuit of business opportunities. However, investing in           
economic enterprises controlled by authoritarian political elites cannot be devoid of political            
implications. China defends its conduct by pointing to an artificially demarcated line between             
business and politics (Bradbury, 2012, p. 373). This thesis argues that the unambiguous             
separation of the economic and political domain is not possible, especially not in the context of                
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Sino-South Sudanese relations. Chapter three will continue to elaborate upon this argument by             
analyzing the changes in China’s non-interference policy while also addressing the effects of             
Chinese arms sales to Sudan.  
 
Strengthening domestic and international sovereignty for partner states through bilateral ties 
When laying out the specific characteristics of the model of Flexigemony, Carmody            
states that China’s approach to building bilateral ties is revolving around natural resource             
extraction whilst refraining from “seeking societal transformation” (Carmody, 2011, p. 79).           
These theoretical statements regarding Chinese foreign policy line up with the initial approach of              
China to Sudan and South Sudan. However, this section will argue that China adjusted its               
approach to Sudan by accepting the secession of South Sudan.. China did not seek to transform                
Sudan’s societal structure, rather it adjusted its own approach by supporting South Sudan’s             
independence. The relationship that started with the signing of the CPA between China and              
South Sudan is a testimony to the primacy of economic interest over political considerations.              
China realized it needed to tailor its foreign policy to the specific historic reality of this region (a                  
flexigemonic trait) and understood that, in order to ensure continued oil extraction, it needed to               
support South Sudan’s secession from Sudan (Bradbury, 2012, p. 388). This was in stark contrast               
with China’s proclaimed commitment to sovereignty for its partner states. This decision was             
based on pragmatic considerations, where economic interest trumped China’s rhetoric of respect            
for territorial sovereignty (Large, 2009).  
China was among the first countries to officially recognize the Republic of South Sudan              
in 2011. The referendum deciding on this issue of independence saw 99% of the voters in favor                 
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of secession from Sudan (Rice, 2011). ​Part of the decision of China to support secession stems                
from its realization that Khartoum’s government was not able to control large parts of its own                
territory. This presented a problem for China, were it to continue its resource extraction. China               
realized it’s continued support of Sudan’s government would be counterproductive to its            
economic interests in the region. If China would decide to stay its course by continuing support                
of Khartoum it would risk to alienate South Sudan. This was a risk that China was not willing to                   
take, especially due to the fact that 75% of proven oil wells in Sudan were present in the region                   
that is now South Sudan (Large, 2011, p. 30). 
Interestingly, China’s support for South Sudan’s secession did not only negatively impact            
Sudan’s sovereignty (which China had stated it would protect), it also made China engage with a                
government that emerged from a rebel movement. China, while pushing for the establishment of              
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, specifically articulated its desire to combat the             
‘three evils’ of “religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism” (Yuan, 2010,            
p. 856). China’s decision to support South Sudan’s secession and its political engagement to the               
newly established government in Juba do not square with China’s rhetoric regarding its goals for               
the erection of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We can thus see that China’s approach to               
foreign policy in the end is not based on ideology or even its own proclaimed respect for                 
territorial sovereignty. Rather, it should be viewed as a flexible approach, prone to change when               
economic interests have to be safeguarded. These observations fit neatly into the model of              
flexigemony, which states that China’s flexible approach is adapted to its partner states in pursuit               
of economic interest. 
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Chapter 3 
Chinese non-interference and arms trade in South Sudan 
 
Chapter one and two analyze China’s involvement in Sudan and South Sudan through the              
application of the flexigemony model. Chapter three will elaborate on the specific conditions             
present within the Sino-South Sudanese bilateral ties that have changed the nature of Chinese              
engagement to South Sudan. Firstly, in order to provide focus, this chapter will assess the               
changing nature of China’s long-standing foreign policy of non-interference in regard to South             
Sudan. In addition, China’s role within the international community, and specifically the UNSC,             
will be linked to China’s relations with Sudan and South Sudan. Secondly, the issue of arms                
trade and its implications for Chinese ties to South Sudan will be discussed. Together these               
points will show the changing nature of China’s role in South Sudan and the effects of Chinese                 
involvement for the region. Furthermore, this chapter aims at exploring the flexigemony model             
by describing when and why China’s approach to South Sudan changes. The flexigemony model              
states that economic, political and military levers can be utilized to ensure continued resource              
extraction. By assessing the variables of ‘non-interference’ and ‘arms trade’ this chapter intends             
to show when which lever is used. 
 
China’s approach to non-interference 
 
Non-interference “rhetoric encourages the impression that China is not imposing its           
political views, ideals or principles onto recipient countries and reinforces the perception that             
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China is now ‘non-ideological’ and pragmatic, since its concerns are for securing resources             
rather than transforming hearts and minds.” (Power, 2012, p. 245) Carmody argues that China’s              
flexigemonic approach of prioritizing Chinese economic interests over other considerations is           
obscured by framing bilateral ties with African states as “South-South cooperation and            
“win-win” scenarios.” (Carmody, 2010, p. 503) The flexigemony model can be used to shed light               
on the discrepancies between the official Chinese foreign policy to South Sudan and the              
outcomes of this approach. Bradbury (2012), Power (2012), Carmody (2010), and Large (2008),             
amongst others, agree that the case of (South) Sudan and China is key in understanding the                
changing nature of China’s non-interference policy. “Sudan is seen as the geopolitical territory             
where Beijing faces the challenge of accommodating its established and ideological policy with             
the complexity of African politics” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 363).The dynamics present in the             
country have resulted in China softening and changing its stance on the non-interference policy              
(Large, 2008, p. 105). 
Non-interference in domestic political affairs and respect for state sovereignty have           
allowed Chinese investors to engage with authoritarian regimes that have used Chinese money             
for committing crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and fueling conflict (Power, 2012, p.             
216) (Bradbury, 2012). Despite the legitimacy of these criticisms on China and its oil companies               
it is important to that, as brought forward by Patey, investments in unstable countries is not                
confined to Chinese companies but rather a trait of oil companies worldwide (Patey, 2014, p.               
269). 
The triangular relationship between China, Sudan and South Sudan, as explained in            
chapter one, resulted in the need for China’s involvement in political affairs in order to ensure                
27 
the continuation of resource extraction. China’s focus on economic interest results in the need for               
long-term stability in the regions it decides to invest in. In light of this realization, it becomes                 
clear that a policy of non-interference is untenable in securing economic interests in the long run                
(Power, 2012, p. 245). Increased political and military involvement might prove to be the              
necessary tools China requires to protect its overseas investments and economic interest ​(Large,             
2008). ​China did this by maintaining ties with both Khartoum and Juba through official state               
visits and the use of special envoys, in its attempt to mediate the uneasy balance between Sudan                 
and South Sudan. China used its political influence to push for an agreement on the use the                 
Sudanese infrastructure to ensure continued oil extraction from South Sudan (Patey, 2014). ​This             
approach resulted in China’s political involvement, which did not align with its rhetoric of              
non-interference. However, China’s pragmatism and the primacy of economic interest have           
shown to trump ideological considerations and thus China’s political involvement became a fact.             
In the next paragraphs China’s changing role within the international community, which led to              
China’s military involvement, will be discussed. 
 
China and the international community 
China’s role in the ongoing civil war in Sudan became exposed and scrutinized             
internationally by American lobby groups in 2006. The Olympic games of 2008, hosted in              
Beijing, would come to be known as the ‘Genocide Olympics’, in an effort to raise awareness of                 
China’s role in Sudan. China received criticism for its support of Khartoum’s government, which              
was financing the civil war in Sudan and the violence in Darfur with funds received from                
Chinese investments in the oil industry (Power, 2012, p. 245). Western countries have pointed to               
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China’s continued bilateral engagement to Sudan as a factor that has inhibited Western countries              
from pressuring Sudan into ending violence in Darfur (Woods, 2008, p. 1207)​. ​Furthermore,             
Beijing has repeatedly used its position within the UNSC to block international sanctions from              
being imposed upon the Sudanese government. In 2004 China used its veto power to block               
multiple resolutions of the UNSC that were aimed at ending the violent civil war in Sudan.                
Meanwhile, China’s arms trade to Sudan continued in spite of arms embargoes. These actions              
taken by Beijing effectively limited the ability of the international community to attempt to end               
violence in Sudan (Bradbury, 2012, p. 371). China defended its actions by insisting on Sudan’s               
sovereignty (Power, 2012, p. 246). 
However, in recent years, the nature of China’s role within the international community             
has undergone changes. This was, in part due, to the fact that China wanted to establish the                 
image of a responsible actor. China realized that its policy of non-interference would not fit               
within this context (Large, 2008, p. 105). China’s voting behavior within the UNSC on matters               
concerning Sudan and South Sudan are a testimony to this fact. The shift of China’s position can                 
be seen when in 2012 China voted to approve UNSCR 2035, effectively China's signing of the                
resolution meant it admitted to the state-sponsored violence present within the conflict in Darfur              
(Bradbury p. 382). This was a break from China’s approach, where Beijing had previously had               
been unwilling to internationally condemn Khartoum’s conduct. Furthermore China’s changing          
role within the international community and its deepening involvement within Africa have made             
it change its position on peacekeeping missions. Whereas before China would have argued that              
peacekeeping mission are an extreme form of interference and a way for the West to impose its                 
ideology on developing nations, from 2008 onwards China has showed a larger willingness to              
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cooperate with the United Nations and military interventions (Large, 2009)​. ​With China’s rise as              
a global actor, its role within the UNSC has changed over the years. “As China has become a                  
more assertive participant in Council deliberations, UN peace operations have come to more             
closely align with its principled and causal beliefs.” (MacLeod, 2017, p. 395) Intervention within              
states can now be condoned by China if the intervention adheres to certain conditions. First of                
all, intervention must be initiated with United Nations authority whilst respecting the sovereignty             
of target state. In addition, the use of force can only be applied when other means to achieve the                   
United Nations mission have proven to be ineffective (Carmody, 2010, p. 504). 
In 2014 China became involved in the volatile regional dynamics of South Sudan by              
sending 700 peacekeeping forces. This was done in order to “ensure the safety of its workers and                 
assets in Africa and guarantee a steady flow of energy for domestic consumption.” (Bariyo,              
2014) This decision, once again, reflected the primacy of economic interest in China’s foreign              
policy. China’s change regarding non-interference was made complete with the decision to            
become militarily involved in South Sudan. China now find itself in a position where it is                
involved politically in maintaining an uneasy balance between Juba and Khartoum in an attempt              
to safeguard its economic interest of resource extraction. While, in cooperation with the UNSC,              
China has diverted from its long-standing principle of non-interference through its military            
involvement in the region.  
In the last section of this thesis a discussion on China’s arms trade will be used to further                  
elaborate upon the discrepancy between China’s official policy of non-interference and the            
reality of China’s engagement to South Sudan.  
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Arms Trade 
 
“Business is business” 
- Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong (Taylor, 2007b, p. 21) 
 
Intentional or not, China’s oil diplomacy and its weakening stance on non-interference in             
Sudan and South Sudan, as discussed in the previous paragraphs, have had serious political,              
military and economic consequences for the region. In the years prior to South Sudanese              
independence China cultivated bilateral ties with Khartoum’s government, oil extraction being           
the primary concern within the Sino-Sudanese relation. In order to ensure continued resource             
extraction, Sino-Sudanese relations were built upon an infrastructure of personal relations           
between key government officials, and cooperation and interaction between Sudan’s National           
Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, military cooperation and arms             
sales solidified relations between China and Sudan (Large, 2009, p. 616). It is this aspect of arms                 
trade, within the context of Sino-(South) Sudanese relations, that will be discussed here. In the               
upcoming paragraphs arms trade will be explained through the model of flexigemony, whilst also              
addressing its impact. This section will argue that the sale of arms should be considered as a                 
form of interference, carrying serious consequences for politics and stability.  
China has justified its involvement in South Sudan and Sudan by arguing that its              
investments were aimed at building an oil industry that provided the necessary resources for              
increased political stability. Pointing at the fact that these investments have shifted both Sudan              
and South Sudan from oil-importing countries to oil-exporting countries. However, this line of             
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argumentation omits the destabilizing effects of arms sales (Power, 2012, p. 246). Alden             
contributes to this point by stating that China’s arms have had measurable and significant impact               
in various conflicts in Africa. specifically Sudan (Alden, 2010, p. 25). 
Carmody and Taylor argue that China’s willingness to arm countries such as South Sudan              
with military technology and capabilities can be understood through the model of flexigemony,             
rather than assessing Chinese involvement in terms of hard or soft power (Carmody, 2010, p.               
499). Flexigemony defines economic interest as the primary concern of China in its dealings              
abroad. Furthermore, the official policy of non-interference allows China to frame it’s conduct             
abroad solely in terms of economic interest and mutual benefit. This approach has resulted in               
criticism from various countries and international organizations (Power, 2012, p. 216). However,            
when confronted about arms trade in Sudan, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong             
said: “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business...I think the internal              
situation in the Sudan is an internal affair’.” (Taylor, 2007b, p. 21) However, in reality this                
artificial separation of business and politics does not exist in South Sudan. 
As discussed in the previous part of this chapter, China increased its diplomatic             
involvement in the civil war in Sudan in an effort to end the conflict. Meanwhile, evidence of                 
Chinese arms sales in Sudan and South Sudan has been uncovered by various organizations and               
research projects. The money generated from oil trade with China has been used by Sudan’s               
government to sponsor violence and ethnic cleansing in Southern Sudan (Taylor, 2007b p. 20). A               
United Nations Panel of Experts, created under Resolution 1591, concluded that “most            
ammunition currently used by parties to the conflict in Darfur is manufactured either in the               
Sudan or in China” (United Nations Security Council, 2006, p. 37). China’s indiscriminate sale              
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of arms can continue unhindered due to China being the only “major arms exporting power that                
has not entered into any multilateral agreement setting out principles, such as respect for human               
rights, to guide arms export licensing decisions.” (Taylor, 2007b, p. 19)  
Officially, according to Sudan’s government, 58% “of small arms and light weapons,            
their ammunition, and ‘conventional weapons’ […] originated in China” (Leff, 2014, p. 24).             
South Sudan did not report any imports of weaponry to the United Nations. It is important to                 
note that information regarding arms imports remain opaque and that the statistics do not reflect               
the total amount of imports from China. Arms trade and its scope and effects in South Sudan and                  
Sudan have been “deliberately shrouded in mystery” (Leff, 2014, p. 108). However, the report              
concluded that: “weapons and ammunition produced in China, Iran, and Sudan have increasingly             
found their way to non-state users in Sudan and South Sudan’s various conflict arenas.” (Leff,               
2014, p. 108) This continuous supply of arms to both Sudan and South Sudan is positively                
correlated with violence in the region, for both organized and individual use (Leff, 2014, p. 108).                
China’s arms sales to Sudan provided the means for Khartoum to wage war in the southern                
Sudan. This can be seen as “perhaps the most dramatic form of interference in internal affairs”                
(Carmody, 2010, p. 511).  
China’s focus on economic interests and its arms sales cannot be considered devoid of              
political implications. Bradbury states that “Chinese arms sales directly worsened conflict and            
insecurity, and led to numerous violations of human rights - as defined by Beijing as well as                 
international humanitarian law” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 380). In addition, it is argued that Chinese              
arm sales to Sudan and South Sudan can be interpreted as a way to protect oil investments whilst                  
further exposing China’s contradictory stance on non-interference (Large, 2008) (Carmody,          
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2010, p. 511). Maynok (2016) published a quantitative study which supported this argument,             
stating in his findings that a positive correlation exists between Chinese oil imports and arms               
exports to its partner states. Effectively, China’s investments to build Sudan’s military capability             
can be interpreted as a way for China to protect its extractive industry in Sudan. China’s support                 
for Khartoum has allowed the government to stay in power while giving it the means to violently                 
oppress opposition movements (Manyok, 2016, p. 3). Currently, no indication can be found of              
China’s willingness to “reassess its indiscriminate arms sale practices in Sudan” (Power, 2012, p.              
247). This assessment of China’s arms sales further deteriorates China’s commitment to its             
policy of non-interference (Carmody, 2010, p. 512). 
This section has pointed to discrepancies between the proclaimed aim of non-interference            
and the effects of Chinese arms trade with Sudan and South Sudan. It aims to serve the argument                  
that the business model pursued by China, focusing on oil diplomacy, bilateral ties and arms               
trade, carries severe implications for politics and stability within Sudan and South Sudan. The              
softening of China’s non-interference policy and its continued focus on ensuring oil extraction             
and arms sales together paint a picture of Sino-South Sudanese bilateral ties. One where the               
pursuit of economic interests results in an increased political and diplomatic commitment of             
China in order to ensure resource extraction. These political commitments have resulted in             
China’s weakened stance on non-interference whilst arms trade, stemming from China’s focus            
on economic interests, has resulted in the worsening of (political) stability within South Sudan.  
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Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to provide an answer to the following question: ​To what                
extent does the flexigemony model explain the political and military intervention of China in              
South Sudan between 2005 and 2014? ​In order to answer this question the model of flexigemony                
was utilized as a theoretical framework, outlining China’s approach to developing bilateral ties             
with South Sudan. Flexigemony is a model developed to analyze China’s engagement in African              
states. It captures the primacy of economic interest over political and security considerations             
while exploring China’s approach towards acquiring natural resources such as oil. Chapter one             
analyzed the development of bilateral ties between China and South Sudan by providing the              
economic incentives that shaped the relationship. The chapter showed that China, were it to              
ensure continued oil extraction, had to adjust to the regional dynamics between Sudan and South               
Sudan. Chapter two continued with the application of the flexigemony model by analyzing how              
economic considerations rather than political or security considerations shaped China’s ties to            
both Sudan and South Sudan. The third chapter explored the implications of Sino-South             
Sudanese bilateral ties and China’s relationship towards the UNSC by assessing China’s            
changing stance towards its own policy of non-interference. Furthermore, the chapter discussed            
the consequences of arms sales within the context of Sino-South Sudanese relations.  
Together, these chapters clearly show China’s motivations for engagement to South           
Sudan. They show that China, in its pursuit of continued oil extraction, favors pragmatism over               
ideological considerations regarding its policy of non-interference. Using the rhetoric of           
non-interference allows China to focus on that what matters most: the building of economic ties.               
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However, as was shown in this thesis, non-interference is reduced to mere rhetoric when China’s               
economic interests are threatened. China’s continued exposure to the South Sudanese political            
climate has resulted in increased political and military involvement. This proves that China is              
willing to increase its political and military commitment when its economic interest is under              
threat. This finding can be extrapolated towards China’s conduct in other African states, clearly              
showing that China’s decisions revolve around the simple logic of protecting its overseas             
investments. As the flexigemony model states, China formulates its foreign policy to gain access              
to natural resources, which it needs to sustain its growth rate. China’s engagement towards South               
Sudan shows how far China is willing to divert from its own guiding principles of foreign policy                 
to actually achieve this goal. While this case study does not specify how China will adapt to the                  
specific dynamics present in each African state it fosters bilateral ties with, it does show that                
China’s foreign policy is largely based on the pursuit of economic interest. The model of               
flexigemony is able to elucidate this foreign policy approach and manages to structure China’s              
development of bilateral ties within a hierarchical structure of interests, one where rhetoric and              
principle make way for China’s desired path to economic development.  
Furthermore, this study addressed the role of arms trade within the context of bilateral              
ties, pointing at the negative implications for political stability in South Sudan. This analysis              
suggests that arms sales can be understood as fulfilling the flexigemonic component of economic              
interest as well as a method of protecting China’s investments and its investment partners. Future               
studies could be invaluable in confirming or denying these findings. Determining the place of              
arms sales within the model of flexigemony would certainly be important to the understanding of               
China’s engagement to Africa. 
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This research project has analyzed the specific dynamics present within the relation            
between China and South Sudan that resulted in China’s increased political and military             
involvement. One limitation of this thesis is the fact that the political and military involvement of                
China has been established but not sufficiently analyzed in order to evaluate its true extent. A                
follow-up study regarding the scope of China’s involvement, both politically and militarily,            
would be of value, providing insight into the continuous development of Sino-South Sudanese             
relations. Another limitation of this research project is the lack of insight in the decision making                
process of China. Because of this, the thesis has largely evaluated the case study based on output.                 
However, assessing how the foreign policy of China is constructed could be a most valuable               
addition to the debate concerning China’s engagement to Africa. With more knowledge on the              
decision-making processes of the Chinese government, further research could attempt to analyze            
the limitations of China’s willingness to engage both politically and militarily. Furthemore, a             
study of bilateral ties between Angola and China could be of importance due to the fact that 51%                  
of China’s oil imports from Africa originate in Angola. It would be of value for the development                 
of the model of flexigemony and understanding of China’s engagement to Africa to understand              
how bilateral ties between Angola and China developed. This research would especially be             
relevant if compared to the case of Sino-South Sudanese bilateral ties, in an attempt to uncover                
differences and similarities in China’s approach. This would further show the adaptive nature of              
China’s flexigemonic approach whilst addressing the changing nature of China’s engagement to            
Africa. 
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